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Abstract—Public blockchains provide a decentralized method
for storing transaction data and have many applications in
different sectors. In order for users to track transactions, a simple
method is to let them keep a local copy of the entire public
ledger. Since the size of the ledger keeps growing, this method
becomes increasingly less practical, especially for lightweight
users such as IoT devices and smartphones. In order to cope
with the problem, several solutions have been proposed to reduce
the storage burden. However, existing solutions either achieve a
limited storage reduction (e.g., simple payment verification), or
rely on some strong security assumption (e.g., the use of trusted
server). In this paper, we propose a new approach to solving the
problem. Specifically, we propose an efficient verification protocol
for public blockchains, or EPBC for short. EPBC is particularly
suitable for lightweight users, who only need to store a small
amount of data that is independent of the size of the blockchain.
We analyze EPBC’s performance and security, and discuss its
integration with existing public ledger systems. Experimental
results confirm that EPBC is practical for lightweight users.
I. INTRODUCTION
A public blockchain or ledger consists of a set of blocks
that are linked together, where each block contains a set of
transactions. A public blockchain is maintained by a group
of users, who run a consensus protocol (e.g., proof-of-work
with longest-chain) to resolve disagreements regarding the
blockchain. In a simple realization of public blockchain, each
user keeps a local copy of the entire blockchain, meaning that
each user has access to all historic activities and can easily
test whether a new transaction is consistent with the existing
transactions. This explains why a public ledger does not have
to rely on any centralized party. This technique is central to
many popular applications, such as Bitcoin [1].
Although keeping a local copy of the blockchain in ques-
tion simplifies many operations (e.g., transaction searching
and balance calculation), this imposes a substantial storage
overhead because the blockchain keeps growing. For example,
the Bitcoin blockchain includes 472,483 blocks in June 2017,
or 120 GB in volume. This overhead may not be a problem
for modern servers and PCs, but are prohibitive for lightweight
users such as mobile devices and IoT devices. In general, this
would hinder the development of applications that aim are
meant to be built on top of blockchains (e.g., smart contract
system [2]). At the same time, smart phones are the major
way to get online in some areas, especially in underdeveloped
countries, and there is a big need for mobile and lightweight
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users to use blockchains [3]. Therefore, it is urgent to reduce
the storage overhead, especially for those lightweight users.
Indeed, Nakamoto proposes the simplified payment veri-
fication (SPV) protocol in the very first Bitcoin paper [1],
which requires a client to store some, instead of all, blocks
while being able to check the validity of transactions recorded
in the blockchain. This technique is also widely used in
many blockchain-based applications, such as smart contract
system [2]. The basic idea underlying the SPV protocol is
that each user only needs to keep the headers of blocks, rather
than the blocks themselves. This means that the local storage
overhead still increases linearly with the number of blocks,
which grows over time and can quickly become prohibitive for
lightweight users. An alternate approach is that a lightweight
user chooses to trust some nodes in a blockchain system.
However, this practice sacrifice the most appealing feature of
the blockchains, namely the absence of any trusted third party.
Moreover, this approach can be vulnerable to, for example,
Sybil attacks [4].
In this paper, we propose an efficient verification protocol
for public blockchain, dubbed EPBC. The core of EPBC is a
succinct blockchain verification protocol that “compresses” the
whole chain to a constant-size summary, using a cryptography
accumulator [5]. A lightweight user only needs to store the
most recent summary, which is sufficient for the user to verify
the validity of transactions. EPBC can be incorporated into
existing blockchains as a middle layer service, or can be
seamlessly incorporated into new blockchain systems.
In summary, our contributions in this work include:
• We design a novel scheme for lightweight users to use
public blockchains using cryptographic accumulator.
• We analyze the security and asymptotic performance of
the scheme, including its storage cost.
• We report a prototype implementation of the core proto-
col of EPBC and measure its performance. Experimental
results show that the scheme is practical for lightweight
users.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II
we briefly review the background of public blockchains and
the simplified payment verification protocol. In Section III
we describe the design of the core component of EPBC,
i.e., efficient block verification, and analyze its security. Sec-
tion IV describes two common operations for blockchain
based applications using the core component of EPBC, and
we provide the architecture to integrate EPBC with existing
blockchain systems in Section V. Experimental results are
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2given in Section VI to demonstrate the practicability of EPBC,
and Section VII discusses the related prior work. We conclude
the paper in Section VIII.
II. BACKGROUND OF PUBLIC BLOCKCHAIN
A blockchain is a distributed ledger that has been used by
Bitcoin and other applications to store their transaction data,
where a transaction can be a payment operation, smart contract
submission, or smart contract execution result submission.
There are different approaches to construct blockchains. In
this work, we focus on the class of blockchains that are
built on the principle of proof-of-work (PoW) [6]. This class
of blockchains have a low throughput and a high latency,
but have the desirable properties of fairness and expensive-
to-attack. Furthermore, there are many efforts at improving
their performance [7], [8] and characterizing their security
properties [9].
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Fig. 1. In the SVP scheme, a user stores the headers of the blocks, rather
than the blocks themselves. A header contains the relevant meta data (e.g.,
the root of the Merkle tree whose leaves are the transactions contained in a
block). This allows a user to verify whether a given block is valid or not.
Since a blockchain is immutable and append-only, its size
keeps growing. There are proposals for coping with this issue.
A straightforward approach is to trust some user, who can
check the validity of transactions on the user’s behalf. This
approach assumes that the lightweight user always knows who
can be trusted. Another approach is to use the SPV protocol
mentioned above [1]. In this scheme, as highlighted in Fig. 1,
a user only needs to store the block headers, which contain the
root of the Merkle tree of the transactions in the corresponding
block. When a user needs to verify a transaction, it sends
a request to the system asking for the corresponding block,
whose validity can be verified by using the root of the Merkle
tree.
III. DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF EPBC
A. Design Objective and Assumption
The objective of EPBC is to allow lightweight users to
participate in applications that use public blockchains. By
“lightweight users” we mean the users who use devices
that have limited computation/storage capacities, such as IoT
devices and smartphones. Specifically, EPBC aims to allow
lightweight users to achieve the following:
• Efficient storage: A user does not have to store or down-
load the entire blockchain. Instead, a user only needs to
consume a storage that is ideally independent of the size
of the blockchain.
Listen to the blockchain network to 
learn the latest summary.
Generate a proof of the block.
Verify the proof and take action.
Lightweight 
User
Blockchain 
System
Send a request of proof of a block. 
Fig. 2. Illustration of the blockchain verification protocol. The nodes in the
blockchain system with bigger storage capacities can keep a full copy of the
blockchain. These nodes will interact with the lightweight users to help the
latter to verify the validity of blocks.
• Verifiability of transactions: A user can verify whether a
transaction has been accepted by the blockchain or not.
Like any public blockchain constructed according to proof-
of-work, we assume that the majority of the users are honest.
In what follows, we first describe the block verification
protocol, which is the core component of EPBC. Then, we
describe how to use this protocol to construct the EPBC
scheme.
B. The Block Verification Protocol
Fig. 2 gives an overview of the verification protocol. Basi-
cally, a lightweight user can verify the validity of transactions
by interacting with the blockchain system.
The blockchain verification protocol of EPBC consists of
the following four algorithms:
• Setup: This algorithm is executed once by the creator
of the blockchain. The algorithm generates the public
parameters that are needed by the other algorithms.
• Block and summary construction: This algorithm gener-
ates blocks and a summary of the current blockchain.
Anyone participating in the mining competition to build
new blocks is responsible for calculating the summary
of the current blockchain. The summary depends on
the content of the current blockchain and the public
parameters.
• Proof generation: This algorithm generates a proof for
a given block. The proof may depend on, among other
things, the entire blockchain.
• Proof verification: Given the summary of a blockchain
and a proof for a single block, this algorithm verifies
whether the proof is valid or not.
With this protocol, a lightweight user keeps the updated
summary of the blockchain. When the user wants to verify
a specific block, it can ask the parties that are involved in a
transaction for a proof for the block, which is generated by
running the proof generation algorithm. The user then executes
the proof verification algorithm to determine whether to accept
the block or not. In what follows we describe the details of
these algorithms.
a) Setup.: The creator of the blockchain selects two large
prime numbers p, q, and calculates N = pq as in the RSA
accumulator system. N is embedded into the first block and
disclosed to the public; and then p, q are discarded. The creator
also selects a random value g ∈ Z∗N . Each block will be
labelled with an integer, with the “genesis” block (i.e., the
first block on the blockchain) has the label “1”.
3b) Block and summary construction.: Each block con-
tains, in addition to the standard attributes (e.g., transaction
information and proof-of-work nonce), a new attribute S,
which is the summary of the current blockchain. For the i-th
block, which is denoted by blk i, the attribute Si is calculated
and stored with blk i as follows:
Si =
{
ghash(blki||i) mod N, if i = 1,
S
hash(blki||i)
i−1 mod N, if i > 1.
If the current blockchain contains n blocks, Sn is the summary
of the current blockchain. The block position information i
is used in the computation for the purpose of preventing the
attacker from manipulating the position of a block. After the
newly generated block is broadcast to the blockchain system,
the following two algorithms can be executed.
c) Proof generation.: To generate a proof that shows
block blki is the i-th block on the blockchain with summary
Sn, where i ≤ n, the prover calculates pi = (p(1)i , p(2)i ) as
follows:
pi =
{
p
(1)
i = hash(blki||i),
p
(2)
i = g
(
∏n
k=1 hash(blkk||k))/hash(blki||i) mod N.
Note that the proof is generated by a user who keeps the entire
blockchain and therefore can compute p(2)i without knowing
φ(N), where φ is the Euler function.
d) Proof verification.: Given a block blk, a claimed proof
p = (p(1), p(2)), and a blockchain summary Sn, a user can
verify that block blki is indeed the i-th block on blockchain
with summary Sn, where i ≤ n, as follows:{
p(1)
?
= hash(blk i||i),
Sn
?
= (p(2))p
(1)
mod N.
If both equations hold, the user accepts that p is a valid proof
for blk; otherwise, the verifier rejects the block.
C. Parameter Initialization
One of the key steps in the blockchain verification protocol
is the parameter initialization, i.e., selecting p and q to generate
the modulus N . If p or q is exposed, the protocol is clearly not
secure. This issue can be addressed by generating N using a
multi-party protocol. There have been many protocols for this
purpose. For example, the protocol proposed by Cocks [10]
works as follows. Suppose at the beginning there are ` users
who work together to generate the first block.
1) Each user i, 1 ≤ i ≤ `, selects his/her own prime
numbers pi, qi.
2) Each user i, 1 ≤ i ≤ `, calculates N = (p1+ p2+ · · ·+
p`)(q1+q2+ · · ·+q`). By leveraging the protocol given
in [10], user i can calculate N without knowing the two
factors of N .
3) Each user tests whether N is a product of two prime
numbers or not. Specifically, the system randomly se-
lects a random number x and each user calculates xpi+qi
mod N . If
∏
xpi+qi mod N ≡ xN+1 mod N , N
passes the test. Carmichael numbers that can pass this
test can be further eliminated by methods given in [11].
4) If the current N passes all tests, users work together to
embedded it in the genesis block. Otherwise they repeat
the process again, until an appropriate N is found.
Since N only needs to be generated once, the cost of the
parameter initialization is not a big concern.
D. Security and Performance of the Block Verification Proto-
col
It is straightforward to verify that the protocol is correct,
meaning that any legitimate proof will be accepted as valid.
The following theorem shows that for a given summary S of
blockchain BC , no attacker can generate a valid proof for a
forged block blk ′ that is not contained in BC under strong
RSA assumption.
Theorem 1: Given a summary Sn of blockchain BC , there
is no probabilistic polynomial-time attacker A that can forge
a block blk ′ and an accompanying proof P ′ that blk ′ is a
valid block on blockchain BC in the random oracle model;
otherwise, the Strong RSA assumption is broken.
Proof: Suppose hash() behaves like a random oracle.
Let ri = hash(blk i||i) where blk i is the i-th block on BC ,
and Sn = g
∏n
k=1 rk mod N . We consider two scenarios of
attacks:
• The attacker knows the summary Sn but not the
blockchain. Suppose the attacker chooses blk ′ and posi-
tion i′ for the block. Then, the attacker needs to compute
y ∈ Z∗n such that
yhash(blk
′||i′) mod N = Sn.
This immediately breaks the Strong RSA assumption.
• The attacker knows both blockchain and the summary Sn.
In this case, the attacker knows all valid proofs for blocks
in BC , i.e., (ri, S
1
ri
n mod N), i = 1, . . . , n. Suppose
the attacker can generate a valid proof for a forged block
blk ′ for some position i′. Let r′ = hash(blk ′||i′). If
r′|∏ni=1 ri, the attacker can successfully make a valid
proof for blk ′ at position i′ because the attacker can
compute (r′, S
∏n
i=1 ri/r
′
n ). Because the attacker cannot
control the output of hash(), the probability that the
attacker can succeed is equivalent to the probability that
a random number r′ is a factor of another random number
R =
∏n
i=1 ri. According to Erdo¨s-Kac theorem [12] and
its extension counting multiplicities [13], the number of
prime factors of R counting multiplicity is O(log logR).
With Binomial theorem, the total number of divisors of
R is O(2log logR) = O(logR), and limR→∞ logRR = 0.
Therefore, the probability that an attacker can find r′ is
negligible when R is large enough. As long as the attacker
cannot find such r′, a successful attack implies that the
the Strong RSA assumption is broken.
In summary, there is no practical attack against the protocol in
the random oracle model unless the Strong RSA assumption
is broken.
Performance of the major algorithms is analyzed as follows.
• Block construction. When compared with the straight-
forward method by which each user keeps the entire
4blockchain, our method incurs some extra work in the
block construction algorithm. The extra work consists of
two parts: evaluating the hash value of the new block and
calculating the new summary. The computation overhead
is constant (i.e., one hash calculation and one modular
exponentiation) and the storage overhead is also constant
(i.e., an element in ZN for the summary). The summary
also incurs extra communication cost, which is however
small (e.g., 2048 bits for a 2048-bit N ).
• Proof generation. The proof generation algorithm does
not incur extra storage. The computational cost is pro-
portional to the length of the current blockchain (i.e., the
number of blocks in the chain) and the position of the
block. Suppose the length of the blockchain is n, and the
proof of i-th block needs to be generated, where i ≤ n.
The prover needs to conduct one hash evaluation of the
ith block, and calculates the product of hash values of
blocks 1, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , n. In summary, the prover
calculates n+1−i hashes, n−1 multiplications, and one
modular exponentiation. Since the nodes with sufficient
storage capacity (rather than the lightweight users) are
supposed to generate proofs, the protocol is practical.
• Proof verification. The computational cost to verify the
proof of a block includes one hash evaluation and one
modular exponentiation, which is constant. This explains
why the protocol is suitable for lightweight users who
only keep the summary of the blockchain.
E. Reducing Cost of Proof Generation
Although both the cost of updating the summary of a
blockchain and the cost of verifying a block are constant,
the computational complexity for the prover to generate a
proof is O(n), where n is the number of current blocks on
the blockchain (i.e., n keeps increasing). In the worst-case
scenario, the prover needs to traverse all of the blocks on the
blockchain to calculate the second part of the proof, namely
g(
∏n
k=1 hash(blkk))/hash(blki) mod N.
In order to reduce the computational complexity incurred by
this, we design a scheme that improves the computational
efficiency at the price of a slight increase in storage.
a) Proof generation with a smaller computational com-
plexty.: The basic idea underlying the scheme is to let the
prover maintain a binary tree T . As illustrated in Fig. 3,
the binary tree is used to store intermediate results that can
be used to generate a proof for a given block. Specifically,
each leaf stores the hash value of a corresponding block, and
each internal node stores the product of its two direct children
nodes. This way, the root node stores the product of the hash
values of all of the blocks on the blockchain. The height of
T is pre-determined. If a leaf is empty (i.e., currently there is
no corresponding block on the blockchain), its value is set to
1 so that it does not contribute to the value stored at the root
node.
Suppose the height of tree T is h and the number of currrent
blocks on blockchain is n, where n < 2h−1. To calculate a
proof for block blk i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the prover leverages
the information stored in T as follows:
blk1 blk2 blk3 blk4 blki
h1 h2 h3 h4 hi
h1h2 h3h4
h1h2h3h4
h1h2…hi
……
……
……
……
……
Fig. 3. The storage structure that can be used by a prover to reduce its
computational complexity when generating proofs. Each leaf hi stores the
hash value of a block, and each internal node stores the product of the values
stored at its two children.
• Find the product of all of the values on the right-hand of
blk i (the blockchain grows from left to right)
r ←
n∏
k=i+1
hash(blkk). (1)
Instead of conducting the multiplication operation one-
by-one, the prover utilizes different products information
stored in T to accelerate the computation.
• Calculate LR ← (Si)r/hash(blki) mod N .
• Set the proof as P ← (hash(blk i), LR).
Note that the height of T determines the number of blocks
it can accommodate, and is therefore a pre-determined public
parameter. If the height of T is h, the total number of blocks
it can accommodate is 2h−1. This is no significant constraint
because a relatively small h can accommodate a large number
of blocks. For example, when h = 32, the structure can
accommodate 4,294,967,296 blocks, which are about 9,000
times larger than the number of blocks on the Bitcoin network
as of April 2017.
b) Analysis of the improved scheme.: The improved
scheme involves a binary tree T to store some information
that can be used for generating proofs. Let height(T ) =
h, meaning that n = 2h−1 is the number of leaves. Let
|hash()| = `. At the leaf level (i.e., the first level), the size
of each node is `. Each node at i-th level incurs i · ` bits of
storage, and the size of the root node is h · ` bits. Therefore,
the size of T is
n · `︸︷︷︸
first level
+ · · ·+ (n/2i) · (2i`)︸ ︷︷ ︸
i-th level
+ · · ·+ (n/2h−1) · (2h−1`)︸ ︷︷ ︸
h-th level, root
=
h−1∑
i=0
n · ` = h · n · ` = (log2 n+ 1) · n · ` = O(n log n).
5With intermediate results stored in T , the computation com-
plexity for generating a proof is reduced to h (or O(log n))
modular exponentiations.
More generally, if each internal node in Fig. 3 has m
children, the height of T is reduced to logm n+ 1. A similar
analysis shows that the total size of T is (logm n+ 1) · n · `,
which is the size of storage a prover keeps locally. In order
to calculate r, which is defined in Equation (1), it requires
about logm n+m multiplication operations in the worst-case
scenario, where m is the number of multiplications incurred
at an internal node at the second level of T . In order to select
the value of m so as to minimize the overall computational
complexity, we calculate the derivative as follows:
(logm n+m)
′ = (
lnn
lnm
+m)′ = 1− lnn
m ln2m
,
which monotonically increases with respect to m. Therefore,
we get the minimum value when
1 =
lnn
m ln2m
,
and m ≈ lnn. In practice, we can set the number of branches
to a small constant integer so as to reduce the computational
complexity of the prover.
IV. USING THE BLOCK VERIFICATION PROTOCOL TO
CONSTRUCT EPBC
In this section, we discuss construction of high-layer
operations based on the verification protocol described in
Section III. Specifically, we focus on two basic protocols:
blockchain identification and transaction verification.
a) Blockchain identification.: When a lightweight user
needs to join a blockchain based application, it needs to obtain
the current summary of the blockchain. Protocol 1 is for this
purpose.
Protocol 1 Blockchain identification.
1: The lightweight user randomly selects a group of ` users,
denoted by Gu, from the blockchain network;
2: for all u ∈ Gu do
3: The lightweight user queries u to get the summary value
S(u);
4: The lightweight user interacts with u to verify the
validity of S(u) with respect to a random set of blocks
chosen by the lightweight user;
5: end for
6: The lightweight user calculates
S ← SummaryDetermination(S(1), . . . S(`)),
which returns the summary that is provided by majority of
the users, where S is the final summary of the blockchain;
Note that as long as the attacker does not control majority
of the ` users, the protocol is secure. The lightweight user
can also adopt other strategies to determine the summary,
e.g., giving different weights to selected users and include this
information when making the decision.
b) Transaction verification.: A transaction is valid if and
only if the block it belongs to is accepted by the majority of
users, i.e., on the longest branch of the blockchain. Therefore,
verification of a transaction is reduced to checking the validity
of a block and its position (i.e., block number). A lightweight
user can use the block verification protocol to verify that the
block in question indeed contains the transaction in question.
Then, the lightweight user can check the number of blocks
that have been added after the block that is verified. Similar
to the Bitcoin system [1], if more than 6 blocks have been
added to the blockchain after the block under consideration,
the transaction in question can be accepted with high confi-
dentiality.
If the transaction is a smart contract submission or one-
time smart contract execution result submission, the above
method is also sufficient. However, if the transaction is a pay-
ment operation or submission of multiple-time smart contract
execution result, freshness becomes a concern. For example,
the attacker can provide proof of an old block that contains
previous payment of the same value. To prevent such attacks,
the lightweight user can maintain a local counter and include
the counter in its transactions.
V. INTEGRATION WITH EXISTING BLOCKCHAIN SYSTEMS
Because a lot of public blockchain applications have been
developed, it is useful to enable EPBC for these systems
without modifying existing data structures and client. To
achieve this goal, EPBC can work as a separate service layer
on top of existing blockchain systems. Fig. 4 demonstrates the
relationship between the existing blockchain system and the
newly added EPBC service.
Specifically, a separate EPBC client with embedded param-
eters can be distributed to users who maintain the blockchain
and play the role of a prover. Here parameters are values
that used for blockchain summary construction. Summaries of
the blockchain are not involved in mining, and users can use
existing client to produce new blocks and achieve consensus
on the blockchain. After the user decides to accept a new
block, the EPBC client produces a new summary based on
previous summary value and the new block, and stores the
new summary locally. Note that summaries are determined by
the blockchain itself so EPBC client does not need to run any
consensus mechanism. If the user wants to reduce the time
complexity of generating a proof, EPBC client can maintain
the tree structure described in Section III-E.
VI. EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATION
In this section, we describe the implementation and provide
preliminary experimental results of EPBC. We focus on the
block verification protocol because it is the core of EPBC.
a) Implementation and parameters.: We implemented
a prototype of the block verification protocol based on the
MIRACL crypto library [14]. Since security of the protocol
depends on the Strong RSA assumption, we chose a 1,024
bits N in the implementation. SHA256 was used for hash().
We also set the height of T as 32. When a leaf is empty, its
value is set to 1 and there is no need to store it.
6Original 
Block 1
Original 
Block 2 ……
Original 
Block i
Summary 1 Summary 2 Summary i
Original blockchain operations: 
mining, transaction submitting, transaction verification
EPBC operations:
block monitoring, summary construction, proof generation, 
block selection
Fig. 4. Overview of the integration of EPBC with an existing blockchain
systems. A dedicated client is used to support EPBC related operations.
b) Experimental results.: We conducted the experiments
on a desktop with a low-end Intel Celeron 1017U processor,
which has a similar Geekbench 4 score of Snapdragon 805
processor [15]. The experimental results are summarized in
Fig. 5, which shows that although the cost of proof generation
depends on the size of the blockchain, the cost of proof
verification is independent of the blockchain size.
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Fig. 5. Preliminary experimental results of the block verification protocol
using a low end Celeron CPU.
As discussed in Section IV, some high-level operations like
balance checking require the lightweight client to verify more
than one blocks. This is not a problem in practice for the
user using lightweight client because it only takes about 0.02
second to verify one block.
VII. RELATED WORKS
EPBC only provides the mechanism for checking the va-
lidity of a given block and the transactions contained in the
block. It does not consider how to determine which block(s)
should be checked. It is proposed in BIP 37 to use a bloom
filter to select potentially related blocks for verification [16].
The Bitcoin community proposes the UTXO (unspent trans-
action outputs) technology, which requires the user to store
unspent transaction output information instead of transaction
information. This reduces the storage cost but does not change
the order of storage complexity [17].
Cryptographic accumulator was first developed by Benaloh
and De Mare to achieve decentralized digital signature [5].
Baric´ and Pfitzmann developed a collision-free accumulator
and used it for fail-stop signatures without using any tree struc-
ture [18]. Cryptographic accumulators are useful (e.g., con-
structing group signatures [19]). Dynamic cryptographic accu-
mulator can further support adding/removing members [20].
These schemes do not consider features of blockchains,
namely that every user has the privilege to construct blocks
and generate proofs and lightweight users have very limited
computational capability. Recently, e-cash systems such as
ZeroCoin also utilizes cryptographic accumulators, but for a
different purpose of information hiding [21].
Another line of related research is storage verification in
the cloud environment, and several related concepts were
proposed, e.g., provable data possession [22] and proof of
retrievability [23]. These schemes cannot be applied in our
scenario because the lightweight users do not know the
blockchain in advance and the blockchain keeps growing as
new blocks are created and appended to it.
Both EPBC and SPV assume the records that are embedded
into blocks are correct if the corresponding blocks are valid.
Some techniques that are applicable to SPV, such as bloom
filter [24], are also applicable to EPBC. Nevertheless, EPBC
incurs only a constant amount of storage for the lightweight
client, assuming the client cares about most recent transac-
tions. This is significant because storing several block headers
might be cheaper than storing the summary value.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have presented EPBC, a scheme for lightweight users
to use blockchain-based applications without storing the entire
blockchain while still able to verify the validity of blocks
and transaction. The basic idea is to “compress” a blockchain
to a constant-size summary, which is the only data item a
lightweight client needs to keep. We analyzed the security of
EPBC and preliminary experiments showed that it is practical.
EPBC can be adopted for blockchain-based applications, such
as e-cash and smart contract systems.
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